Information Management Principles Applied to the Ballistic Missile Defense System by Koehler, John M., II
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-2-2007 
Information Management Principles Applied to the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System 
John M. Koehler II 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Systems Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Koehler, John M. II, "Information Management Principles Applied to the Ballistic Missile Defense System" 
(2007). Theses and Dissertations. 3060. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3060 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 




























PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE BALLISTIC 





















DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 


























The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 

























INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE BALLISTIC 







Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 




Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 


























INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO THE BALLISTIC 
























 Information systems (IS) have evolved over the last 50 plus years from individual 
components with single functionality to grand architectures that integrate multiple 
individual business functions into global organizational enterprises.  Similarly several 
military systems with the single mission of missile defense have evolved in service 
stovepipes, and are now being integrated into a national and global missile defense 
architecture.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently tasked with developing an 
integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of defending against all 
ranges of ballistic missiles in all phases of flight in defense of the homeland, our 
deployed forces, and our allies.  While this initiative has been proceeding since before 
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the full momentum has only recently been 
achieved through the withdrawal of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and demonstrated 
threats from North Korea and Iran.  This study draws parallels between the evolution of 
IS and the BMDS.  Further it compiles information management (IM) principles, 
investigates if they apply to the BMDS, and investigates if they can be used to achieve a 
better integrated system.  Initial indications are that IM principles do apply, but it is 
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           The MDA has been tasked to develop the BMDS.  This system will be relied upon 
to protect our nation’s homeland, military personnel and assets abroad, allies’ homelands, 
and deployed personnel.  Missile defense systems have been in development ever since 
the first V-2 rocket was launched by Germany in WWII.  In 1981 Ronald Reagan gave a 
speech envisioning a world (not just our nation) free from the threat of ballistic missiles 
starting the development of a missile defense system resembling what we have today.  
The result of this long development is a set of legacy and new stovepipe systems 
developed with integration as an afterthought.  While technology has provided methods 
to link all these systems together, technology does not offer a total system plan for the 
proper integration of these systems.  As the BMDS was being designed, the computer 
revolution unfolded and with it the information age was ushered in.  As this occurred the 
discipline of managing information progressed through missteps and mismanagement.  
Today IM is a mature discipline with many lessons learned in project management and 
creating systems of systems that deal with information.  With an analogous evolution, IM 
should provide insight into how the BMDS could be integrated as a complex information 






 The issue of missile defense has existed since the first flight of the V-2 rocket 
(General Accounting Office, 1993).  This event spurred a chain of events characterized 
by changing missile defense architectures.  These architectures were influenced by the 
threat environment, technical possibility, and politics.   
 In 1955 the Army and Air Force (AF) began assessing the possibility of a BMDS.  
From this, the Army produced the Nike-Zeus system comprised of four radars, the Zeus 
missile, and a computer fire control system (General Accounting Office, 1993).  The 
system became the first operational BMDS in 1965 (Jane's Information Group, 2005). 
 In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson made the Nike-Zeus our first National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system named Sentinel.  The architecture was to cover 14 locations, 10 
of which were major cities (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  But, in 1969 President Nixon 
made his mark by downsizing the architecture to provide for defense of U.S. Minuteman 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., and at 
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, together with a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
Center at Cheyenne Mountain Complex, Colorado (General Accounting Office, 1993).  
Additionally, he changed the name to Safeguard (MDA Historian Office, 2001).  One of 
the reasons for the shift in defense locations was political discontent about the idea of 
nuclear tipped missiles possibly exploding and reigning debris over the population 
centers the system was meant to protect (General Accounting Office, 1993). 
 In 1972 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed along with an additional 
protocol in 1974 that altered the Safeguard system design.  The treaty limited the USSR 
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and USA to one site with no more than 100 interceptors (General Accounting Office, 
1993).  Grand Forks became the first US BMD site on 1 October, 1975.  The site was 
only operational for four months, however, because Congress deemed it too costly to 
sustain (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  The treaty also set a precedent distinguishing 
between theater missile defense (TMD) and NMD.  This distinction set a precedent for 
developing systems separately for each mission and limiting their scope. 
The most dramatic revolution in BMD architecture came after Ronald Reagan 
gave a speech envisioning a world free from the threat of ballistic missiles.  This speech 
came after the president was informed of Russia’s new ICBM capability of raining 
thousands of nuclear warheads down over the US (General Accounting Office, 1993).  
President Reagan along with Secretary of Defense Weinberger created the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) (General Accounting Office, 1993).  Under SDI a new massive 
system of systems was conceived with the mission of defending against the Soviet threat 
(General Accounting Office, 1993).  In 1987 a Phase I architecture included (MDA 
Historian Office, 2001):  
- Space-based Interceptor (SBI) 
- Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) 
- Ground-based Sensor (GBS) 
- 2 Space-based Sensors (SBS) 
- Battle Management System 
To manage this undertaking the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was 
created with an AF General as director (General Accounting Office, 1993).  The process 
for acquiring this system would be an evolutionary incremental development with a 
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phased deployment providing incremental capability.  The capabilities sought would be 
based on arms control negotiating leverage rather than technical or threat based merit 
(General Accounting Office, 1993).  This affected the system’s development progress.  A 
Defense Science Board criticized the SDIO citing “weaknesses in management and 
technical support for system design and integration” (General Accounting Office, 1993).  
Technology still influenced design, however.  In 1989 the system exploited the 
miniaturization revolution in computers and sensors replacing the SBI (a large warehouse 
satellite that launched kill vehicles) with a system coined Brilliant Pebbles (thousands of 
tiny individual space-based kill vehicles) (MDA Historian Office, 2001).  
 Again, in 1990, world events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall led to 
reexamining policy and technical goals of the SDI.  The SDIO initiated a new study for 
an architecture optimized for current threats (General Accounting Office, 1993).  In 1991 
President George H.W. Bush provided input to SDIO resulting in the Global Protection 
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system.  This system, as its acronym suggests, was 
focused on limited strike scenarios such as those witnessed in Desert Storm (as apposed 
to massive volume of incoming warheads) (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  The new 
architecture was now composed of (General Accounting Office, 1993): 
 - Patriot  
 - Corps Surface to Air Missile 
 - Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
 - Brilliant Pebbles 
 - NMD: GBI, GBS, SBS 
 - Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications system (BM/C3) 
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 GPALS only lasted until 1993 when yet another review was conducted for a new 
president.  Under the Clinton Administration the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was lead by 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin finding that TMD was now the primary threat BMD was 
to defend against (General Accounting Office, 1993).  This finding was partially based on 
intelligence community estimates and placed TMD as the priority with NMD a far 
second.  Secretary Aspin announced the “end of the Star Wars era” and renamed SDIO 
the BMD Organization (BMDO) (General Accounting Office, 1993).  The new system 
had distinct architectures for TMD and NMD.  The TMD system included (Larsen & 
Kartchner, 2004): 
 - Patriot 
 - THAAD 
 - Aegis 
The NMD system included (General Accounting Office, 1993): 
 - SBS 
 - GBS 
 - GBI 
 - BM/C3 
Although the Grand Forks BMD system was terminated in 1976, BMDO still planned to 
use the site and the 100 interceptor design for initial deployment of NMD to comply with 
the ABM Treaty (General Accounting Office, 1993).   
Despite a new architecture and new name for its lead organization, BMD 
maintained two trends.  First, the major issue facing BMD was “integration of the various 
elements into a single system (General Accounting Office, 1993).”  Second, and perhaps 
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a driver for the first trend, while a single organization was charged with overseeing the 
development of a BMD system, the Army, Navy, and AF all separately pursued programs 
(Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  To combat this integration issue, at the direction of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the BMDO established a 
Joint Program Office in 1997 and awarded Boeing a contract to act as Lead System 
Integrator.  However, this was only for the NMD system (MDA Historian Office, 2001). 
 The next significant era in BMD was marked by a new BMDO Director, AF Gen 
Ronald T. Kadish appointed in 1999 and newly elected President George W. Bush.  
Together, they significantly reorganized BMD.  President Bush did three significant 
things in 2001.  First, he withdrew from the ABM Treaty which released political 
constraints on possible systems (Hewish, 2002).  Second, he attempted to combine TMD 
and NMD into a single architectural concept (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  Third, he 
restructured the BMDO and renamed it the MDA.  Raising the organization to agency 
status meant it could be appropriated more money signifying its political importance 
(Larsen & Kartchner, 2004). 
 On December 17, 2002 President Bush made another revolutionary move 
announcing intentions to deploy a missile defense with initial capability by 2004 (Larsen 
& Kartchner, 2004).  This would be the last significant change for BMD.  In the face of 
these radical changes, historical trends continued.  The administration continued the 
concept of an evolving architecture that reacted to current threats and utilized emerging 
technologies (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  To produce this evolving architecture, systems 
would be procured through spiral development in support of incremental block 
acquisition (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  In 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
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announced the continuance of the TMD priority.  He also described today’s ambiguous 
overarching guiding BMD concept: a layered defense composed of systems that attack 
ballistic missiles of all types (short, medium, intercontinental) in all phases of flight 
(boost, mid-course, terminal).  Finally, he announced the AF, Army, and Navy would still 
separately deploy elements of the BMDS (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  There was one 
slight break from tradition.  Instead of waiting for a complete, integrated, fully capable 
system, any system with any amount of initial capability would be fielded (Larsen & 
Kartchner, 2004).  The new concept called for fielding the following systems as soon as 
some capability existed (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004): 
 - NMD located at Fort Greely, Alaska with 20 GBIs 
 - Aegis 
 - Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
- THAAD 
 - Upgraded GBS 
 - SBS 
This brings us to today’s system which has not changed significantly since 2002.  
MDA continues to use an evolutionary acquisition strategy that provides added 
capabilities through new technologies (proven or not) in two year block increments 
(General Accounting Office, 2006b).  The systems this strategy is producing are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The current threat environment includes ICBMs from North 
Korea and short and medium range threats from the Middle East.  Political influence is 
motivating development to address long range threats from Iran (Sirak, 2004).  Perceived 
capability would undoubtedly be used for negotiations with Iran with respect to Iraq.  
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One new development is international involvement.  As the BMDS is projected globally, 
international partners are beginning to come on board.  Australia, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom have all began participating in joint BMD activities (Sirak, 2004). 
The history of BMD has been one of changing architectures driven by politics, the 
threat environment, and technology.  Through the various influences, many things 
remained the same.  The acquisition strategy has been one intended to accommodate a 
changing architecture capable of responding to current threats.  For most of its life, the 
BMDS has been championed by a single organization, yet elements were pursued by 
separate services in isolation.  Finally, the integration issue has remained the most 






 In June 1999 Lt Gen Ronald Kadish, Director of the BMDO stated, "Our main 
challenge, now that we have a plan, is to execute it with people and the resources 
available. I really don't see us having a huge technological mountain to climb in the sense 
of having to invent a lot of [new technologies]. The challenge is beginning to be more 
management than it is technical to pull this very complex set of technologies together 
and ... put together a layered defense." (Sirak, 2001) (emphasis added) 
For more than 50 years the Department of Defense (DoD) has been pursuing a 
system to protect against ballistic missiles.  The Navy, AF, and Army have pursued their 
piece of the pie in virtual isolation, despite an appointed organization with oversight of 
the overall system.  Visions of this system have been ambiguous with the requirements 
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even more ambiguous.  Yet, the DoD has persisted in attempting to put a system together 
with no concrete blueprint.  Billions of dollars have been spent on the system with no 
defined plan of how to get from the concept to the end product.  Today there are 
numerous systems with varying capabilities that contribute to the overall mission.  The 
DoD continues to develop the system with no hard architecture or set of requirements.  
The current philosophy is to build something, test it, and evaluate the next step.  This has 
lead to test failures, cost and schedule overrun, and unverified capability.  Voicing the 
inadequacy of this philosophy, Gen Kadish has said the current system has a “better than 
zero” chance of accomplishing its primary mission; intercepting a ballistic missile 
(Brown, 2005).  He stated that the issue is a management issue, yet only technical 
solutions continue to be explored.  This current method is not working.  
 The BMDS is composed of many types of systems: weapon systems, sensors, 
communications systems, and computers.  Combined, this system is traditionally seen as 
a defensive weapon system.  If you look at how the system accomplishes its tasks, 
however, it can be seen as a large complex information system.  Once a sensor detects the 
plume of a launched target, data is created.  That data then traverses the system through a 
network to a computer console where it is transformed into information presented to a 
decision maker.  The decision maker then internalizes the information, combines it with 
additional information and knowledge, and puts forth an order for action.  Looking at the 
BMDS to include the people, command structure, organization and processes, it fits the 
model of an IS.  Treating the BMDS as an IS, can IM principles be applied to provide 






The Air Force has commonly been viewed as the technologically advanced 
service.  Technology is viewed as the panacea for all problems.  Even when management 
programs have been instituted such as Total Quality Management, they have devolved to 
mathematical solutions such as metrics.  Knowledge Management has devolved to a peer 
to peer information depository known as Air Force Knowledge Now.  Technology costs 
money and with the DoD’s ever shrinking budget it has never been more critical to find 
cost effective solutions to our problems.   
The discipline of IM has grown along with the evolution of computer-based 
information systems.  Through many missteps, proven methods for managing large, 
complex, global IS have evolved.  The aim of this evolution has focused around 
information and how to exploit it fully.  IM may be applicable in the military to field 
systems better, faster, cheaper, and with better quality.  There seems to be common 
themes in IM that apply to military systems.  Themes such as Information Strategy, 
Information Architecture, Culture, Standards, Value, Change, Information Life Cycle, 
Alignment, and Information Technology could be used in implementing BMDS elements 
to produce a more efficient system.  For instance, the theme of Standards is important.  
Information must be presented in a standard fashion so that anyone can understand and 
interpret the information presented.  The BMDS is comprised of more than eight 
elements operated by three services and multiple nations.  If information presented by the 
various systems is not standard, and the services do not have a standard for the 
information these systems present, then how can a commander or even the systems of one 
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service accurately and correctly interpret information from the various elements and 
various services?   
 To illustrate, assume the Air Force system defines “Boost Phase” as 0 to 80 miles, 
but the Army defines it as 0 to 60 miles, and these services provided the inputs for their 
respective systems.  An AF satellite detects a launch and codes it as being in its boost 
phase when the target is at an altitude of 65 miles.  The AF satellite sends this 
information to an Army Command and Control (C2) system.  An Army commander then 
assigns an Army interceptor with a range of 0 to 60 miles to take out the target.  The 
intercept will fail because there was not a system-wide standard for the term “Boost 
Phase” during system design.  Applying the IM theme of standards ensures this mistake 
will not happen. 
 Comparing the evolution of IS and the BMDS reveals obvious similarities.  The 
most striking is how each started as component technologies used to address specific 
singular functions.  As technology evolved, these systems became more capable and able 
to address multiple functions.  Now, each has the capability to be used in addressing large 
scope issues such as business administration and missile defense.  IM has also evolved to 
manage the increasingly complex IS.  As it has evolved several themes that govern the 
management of IS have developed.  Analyzing the literature can produce a set of 
governing principles for IS.  The research question is:  Do Information Management 
Principles apply to the BMDS?  Can they be applied to find non-technical solutions to 









Evolution of Ballistic Missile Defense System Elements 
 
 
As Chapter 1 explained, the BMDS has had many different architectures 
composed of various elements.  Today’s architecture has its own unique set of 
components tasked with defending against various ranges of missiles in various phases of 
flight.  These components are to be integrated and managed as a layered system.  A single 
element is being tasked with integrating all the other elements.  Some of these elements 
are legacy systems; they have been upgraded for missile defense.  Other elements are 
new programs, but based on old ideas.  Most of the systems have been developed in 
service isolation despite their joint overall missions.  The following provides brief 
overviews of the elements’ histories, programmatics, and challenges. 
Air Force Elements. 
  Air Borne Laser (ABL).   
The ABL is designed to destroy ballistic missiles in their boost phase of flight 
(General Accounting Office, 2006a).  It is a modified Boeing 747 with a sensor/tracking 
system, battle management system, and laser (General Accounting Office, 2006a).   
The program was started in 1996 with Boeing as the prime contractor and 
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (NG) as subcontractors (General Accounting 
Office, 2006a; Hewish, 2004).  The Air Force provides primary government oversight 
and reports to MDA.  The acquisition strategy is to develop the system in incremental, 
capability-based blocks (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  This plan calls for bringing 
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a capability to attack short to medium range ballistic missiles initially, and ICBMs in the 
future (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).   
Since the program has started, it has been restructured (in 2004) and battled 
technical integration difficulties which have delayed the program passing the prototype 
phase until at least 2008 (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  Ninety-four percent of the 
prototype’s engineering drawings have been released, yet no BMDS integration tests 
have been performed (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  Integrating the ABL may be 
difficult since it was designed to be self contained from launch detection to kill, which 
makes sense, since it would be unlikely to be able to respond to a threat not within its 
range (BMDS booklet: A day in the life of the BMDS2006). 
Space-Based Infrared System, Defense Support Program (SBIRS/DSP).  
SBIRS/DSP are AF satellites with sensor payloads that detect infrared 
events on Earth.  These AF assets are tasked with four missions; only one of which is 
Missile Defense: tracking rockets from launch to terminal descent and passing on the 
track data to the BMDS and interceptor systems supporting MDA.  SBIRS’ three 
additional missions are: Missile Warning, detection of rocket plumes and notification to 
USNORTHCOM; Technical Intelligence, gathering data for rocket characterization 
supplied to the intelligence community; and Battle Space Awareness, gathering data on 
IR events on the ground to better characterize the battlefield situation in near real time in 
support of theater commanders (Burkett, Daniel L., II, 1998).   
 DSP has been around for over 30 years developed by NG for the AF with the sole 
purpose of detecting ICBM launches during the cold war (Burkett, Daniel L., II, 1998).  
In Desert Storm DSP’s ability to detect Scud launches demonstrated additional capability 
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in theater defense.  Wanting to expand on this capability and exploit the full potential of 
IR technology, SBIRS was conceived (Burkett, Daniel L., II, 1998). 
 SBIRS began development in 1995 as a replacement for DSP and to be the 
flagship program for Acquisition Reform (AR) (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  The 
original constellation was to be composed of four satellites in geosynchronous orbit, two 
payloads on host satellites in highly elliptical orbits, a low earth orbit constellation of 20 
satellites (now STSS), and ground stations (Burkett, Daniel L., II, 1998).  The SBIRS 
contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin (LM) with the AF providing government 
oversight (Hewish, 2004).  It was to follow a traditional acquisition strategy, but institute 
the latest AR initiatives such as Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), minimal 
military standards, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, and Total System 
Program Responsibility (TSPR) (Lorell & Grasser, 2000).  In this vein the government 
provided a general set of requirements to LM who was supposed to use their expertise to 
fulfill them.  However, in the course of its design, the disparate user community 
pressured the program managers to add specific requirements (that conflicted between 
communities) late in development (Crock, 2002).  This was compounded by a changing 
threat environment that further exacerbated the requirements creep.  One requirement that 
has been publicized is the use of a 1970’s programming language (Singer, 2005).  This 
was an example of using COTS when inappropriate since it required large modifications 
for the SBIRS cutting edge requirements.   
These issues have resulted in technological problems such as integrating satellite 
systems, multiple program restructuring continually delaying delivery of the first satellite, 
and cost and schedule overruns (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  The DoD has 
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become so disheartened that a new system is being conceived to replace SBIRS which 
has yet to launch a satellite.  Since no satellite has launched, no operationally realistic 
tests have been accomplished to integrate the system with the BMDS or any other 
element. 
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).   
STSS was originally a component of the SBIRS architecture.  It was conceived as 
a low earth orbiting constellation of 20 to 24 satellites with the primary mission of 
tracking all ballistic missiles in all phases of flight and discriminating reentry vehicles 
from countermeasures.  It additionally carried the three other SBIRS missions as well.  
In 2000 the contract for SBIRS Low was given to MDA who renamed it STSS 
and dropped the other three mission areas (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  NG was 
awarded the contract for development with Raytheon as a primary subcontractor.  The AF 
performs primary oversight and reports to MDA.  STSS follows an acquisition strategy of 
spiral development supporting 2-year incremental block development (General 
Accounting Office, 2006a).  This is intended to allow technologies to mature and then 
implement them as they are proven.  In reality, various technologies are being tested on 
satellites acquired through traditional acquisition cycles of around 10 years.  These 
different technologies will be tested and then the most viable technology will be 
incorporated in the operational system several years in the future.   
Despite the restructuring of the program and a new acquisition strategy, technical 
problems have still been encountered integrating components from different contractors 
(General Accounting Office, 2006a).  The STSS Block 06 satellites have not been 
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realistically tested for integration with the BMDS.  However, the final system that would 
be integrated with the other elements has yet to be conceived. 
 
Navy Elements. 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).   
The Aegis BMD system is a complete missile defense system composed of an 
AN/SPY-1 radar sensor capable of tracking short and medium range ballistic missiles in 
all phases of flight, a fire control system linked to the BMDS network, and SM-3 
interceptor missile capable of destroying short and medium range ballistic missiles in all 
phases of flight (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  LM is the prime contractor while 
Raytheon is the prime developer for the SM-3 missile.  The system is based on the Aegis 
combat system originally conceived in 1969 and has remained under the supervision of 
the Navy. 
The Aegis BMD system has had many successes with six successful intercept 
tests (the most realistic) since 1999 (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  One quality 
contributing to this success is an inherently open architecture that relatively easily accepts 
upgrades using COTS systems (Brown, 2005).  This attribute supports the build as you go 
methodology prominent in MDA. 
The Aegis combat system was originally conceived for defending against small 
cruise missiles and aircraft.  As theater defense became a hot issue the Aegis systems 
were upgraded to additionally defend against short range and medium range ballistic 
missiles starting in 1995 (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  This move was pushed by 
the Navy after Desert Storm and validated by the DoD in 1992 (General Accounting 
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Office, 1993; Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  In January of 2002 MDA recognized the 
system’s potential and claimed several ships renaming them Aegis BMD systems 
(General Accounting Office, 2006a).  Since then the focus has been on upgrading the 
system to integrate into the BMDS architecture.  This is done through incremental, 
capability based 2-year blocks (General Accounting Office, 2006a). 
 While piece-meal integration tests have been performed with various BMDS 
elements, an end-to-end flight test with the Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) 
system (with which it is conceptually supposed to support) has yet to be performed 
(General Accounting Office, 2006a).  Nevertheless, on 24 September, 2004 the USS 
Curtis Wilbur deployed to Japan for the first active BMD patrol (Brown, 2005).   
Army Elements. 
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).  
THAAD is a complete system consisting of an interceptor, X-band radar, and fire 
control system tasked with intercepting short and medium range ballistic missiles 
(General Accounting Office, 2006a).    The program was started by the Army in January, 
1992 when the prime contract was awarded to LM and transitioned to MDA later in 
October (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  THAAD is being developed in 
incremental, capability-based 2-year blocks (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  MDA 
plans to hand over the system to the Army for limited operational use in 2009 (General 
Accounting Office, 2006a). 
THAAD has faced several technical issues.  Among them a primary technical 
issue noted by the GAO has been integrating its components such as the missile and 
software developed by different contractors.  While THAAD was conceived to integrate 
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and has been included in separate missile defense architectures with Patriot Advanced 
Capability-3 (PAC-3), the two systems have not been tested together and were designed 
separately.  THAAD was intended to augment the PAC-3 system by making at least 2 
attempts at target intercept before activating PAC-3, which would be a back-up if the 
target got by THAAD (General Accounting Office, 1993). 
THAAD has been restructured due to test failures (General Accounting Office, 
2006a).  As a result an aggressive test schedule has been set (General Accounting Office, 
2006a).  This schedule is probably unrealistic given integration errors have occurred 
within the THAAD system itself (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  It is unlikely the 
system will successfully work initially with other BMDS elements based on these results. 
Patriot Advanced Capability – 3 (PAC-3).   
The PAC-3 is a complete system composed of an interceptor, fire-control system, 
and radar sensor (Lockheed martin missiles and fire control patriot advanced capability-3 
(PAC-3) missile. 2006).  Its primary mission is to intercept short range ballistic missiles 
in their terminal phase of flight (Lockheed martin missiles and fire control patriot 
advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) missile. 2006).  It is also part of another program with 
extended capabilities to intercept air breathing threats such as cruise missiles, UAVs, and 
air to surface missiles.   
The PAC-3 program started in 1983 with LM winning the prime contract in 1987.  
Raytheon was brought on board later to perform system integration.  Government 
oversight is performed by the Army, its primary user community.  As its name implies, 
this is a follow-on system improving over the Patriot system used (with debatable 
success) in the first Gulf War that was used to defend against short-range ballistic 
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missiles and aircraft (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  The first system used an exploding 
warhead as the kill mechanism, which was replaced with hit-to-kill technology in the 
PAC-2 follow-on system in 1995 (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004).  The current system has 
also been upgraded over time through configuration updates.  The second upgrade 
integrated its communications with joint forces while its third configuration interfaced 
the system with THAAD.  Early trials have been completed to integrate the system with 
other land, air, and sea-based sensors. 
PAC-3 is the only BMDS element to see combat.  It successfully performed 
against Scud attacks in Iraq in 2003 (Larsen & Kartchner, 2004). 
Joint Elements. 
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC).   
The C2BMC is the integrating fire control system that links all elements of the 
BMDS together (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  C2BMC pairs weapon systems 
with sensors and directs those weapons on a distributed network.  The system will carry 
out the following functions (General Accounting Office, 2006b): 
- Situational Awareness 
- Capture and display tracking data from multiple sensors 
- Compute impact point 
- Display GMD assets on users computer screens 
- Provide planning tools for battle management 
C2BMC began development in the 1990s.  C2BMC is operated by STRATCOM, 
a joint command, with its development contracted to LM as the prime with NG 
subcontracted.    C2BMC is being procured through a spiral development acquisition 
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strategy (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  It was originally going to be the single 
integration point for C2 physically located at the Joint National Integration Center, 
Schriever AFB, Colorado (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  Now, C2BMC suites are 
being placed at various unified command headquarters (General Accounting Office, 
2006b).  C2BMC appears to be a gateway implementation for the disparate systems and 
their software as the elements all have different software, formats, and languages.  An 
effort has been underway to standardize message formats, but since BMDS elements 
have mission areas outside missile defense, those systems push back on any change.  The 
C2BMC has seen several integration successes operating with various elements of the 
BMDS and passing test data through the system.  Whether it has passed the right data at 
the right time cannot be verified until an end to end operationally realistic test is carried 
out. 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).   
GMD is a system of components.  It includes ground-based interceptors 
commanded by a fire-control system and land, sea, and space-based sensors that provide 
targeting and tracking information (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  The primary 
mission of GMD is the protection of the US against intermediate and long range ballistic 
missiles in mid-course phase of flight (BMDS booklet: A day in the life of the 
BMDS2006).     
The current GMD program was started in 1996, but its concepts trace back to the 
first NMD systems described in Chapter 1 (General Accounting Office, 2006a).  In 1998 
Boeing was awarded the contract for integrating the pieces of the GMD system (Ground-
based mid-course defense (GMD) segment. 2005).  These included the GBI system under 
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development, an evolving C2 system with heritage prior to 1993, legacy land-based 
sensors undergoing upgrades (Cobra Dane in Alaska, Pave Paws in California and 
BMEWS in Greenland and England), the evolving Aegis sensors, a new sea-based X-
band radar, and a space-based sensor not yet operational (SBIRS) (Ground-based mid-
course defense (GMD) segment. 2005).  To add to the complexity, each component has 
government oversight by a different military service.  Even though cross-service 
communication is likely occurring at STRATCOM, this is done at a strategic planning 
level, with little to no input from the element tactical level that has the knowledge of 
what is working and what is not working.  While the acquisition strategy for these 
components is supposed to be a spiral development supporting 2-year block upgrades, the 
reality is upgrades are fielded and tested simultaneously which may lead to rework 
(BMDS booklet: A day in the life of the BMDS2006; General Accounting Office, 2006a).  
This has occurred in the GBI boosters which were fielded prior to operational testing.  
After test failures, production quality was determined to be poor and the fielded boosters 
now require major overhauls which must be accomplished in the field (General 
Accounting Office, 2006a).  This procurement method results in fielded operational 
weapons that have a high probability of not working when critically needed. 
The hardest component is the control system which currently orchestrates an 
engagement (General Accounting Office, 1993).  If this is the system’s largest hurdle, 
combining legacy systems with new systems must contribute to the difficulty.  For 
instance, GMD currently uses the Cobra Dane radar, a fixed (as opposed to swiveling) 
land-based radar developed in the 1970s (Ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) 
segment. 2005).  In addition to requiring upgrades, the radar is incapable of participating 
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in validation tests due to its orientation (General Accounting Office, 2006b).  
Additionally, the space-based sensor (SBIRS) planned to provide critical queing 
information to the fire-control system has yet to be put in place or tested itself (Ground-
based mid-course defense (GMD) segment. 2005).   
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI).   
KEI is a common interceptor being developed to destroy medium, intermediate, 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse phase of flight (General 
Accounting Office, 2006a).  Additionally various launchers and fire control systems are 
being designed for use with it (General Accounting Office, 2006a).   
The program was started in October of 2002 and is being developed by NG and 
Raytheon to potentially replace all interceptors in BMDS elements (General Accounting 
Office, 2006a).   While the program is supposed to follow the MDA acquisition strategy 
of spiral development supporting 2-year block upgrades, the program has already had its 
requirements review delayed 3 years due to funding cuts (BMDS booklet: A day in the life 
of the BMDS2006; General Accounting Office, 2006b).  Additionally, the program has 
already been restructured twice in four years (General Accounting Office, 2006a). 
The program hopes to create a standard system easily integrated into the various 
elements (BMDS booklet: A day in the life of the BMDS2006).  To do this, the program is 
taking tested technologies from various BMDS elements (General Accounting Office, 
2006a).  It is unclear whether this will help compatibility later, or hamper it in the near 
term since the technologies are not necessarily compatible to begin with.  Either way, the 
program’s low level of maturity provides the opportunity to actually design a system with 
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future integration in mind.  This is already occurring as a GAO reports that integration 
and hardware manufacturability are already being dealt with. 
Summary. 
The BMDS is composed of several elements.  While all the elements are 
ultimately overseen by the MDA, most are primarily managed by a single service.  
Additionally, at least one of four common contractors is primarily involved in all of the 
elements.  Several of the elements are based on legacy systems, and even the newest 
“original” elements are based on decades old concepts with all the prejudicial 
preconceived ideas guiding their development.  These systems are supposed to come 
together to create an integrated system, but almost all were designed in isolation of each 
other.  After years of development some are finally being integrated together through 
various piecemeal tests.  The most important element for integration is the C2BMC 
which is providing a gateway for the various systems to communicate.  However, there 
seems to be a problem.  Much of the literature reports capability of single elements 
communicating with other single elements, and not necessarily through the BMDS.  This 
implies there is no cohesive integration plan that all elements have been made aware of or 
signed up to.  So, despite an entire element program being devoted to integrating the 
pieces, it is unclear how these legacy and new systems will come together. 
 
 
Evolution of Computer-based Information Systems and Information Management 
 
 
Many of today’s IS are complex computer-based systems integrated into a vast 
network that spans the globe.  To understand how these systems are managed and used, it 
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is useful to briefly examine their evolution.  To do this, we look at how computers (used 
to manipulate information) evolved as well as methods for managing them. 
The first computers were costly, standalone machines, with limited memory and 
processing capability, used for single functions such as calculation and code-breaking 
(Galliers & Leidner, 2003; Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  These monoliths filled entire 
rooms and were very expensive (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Additionally, computers 
could not switch from one function to another.  So, while companies used information for 
multiple processes, the computer limitation forced redundancy in departments (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  Additionally, due to the capitol investment in these machines, companies 
were reluctant to change processes, since that could require a whole new machine 
(Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  This established a mentality of using machines as much as 
possible to squeeze out the investment.  It also meant new processes had to incorporate 
the old way of doing the machine’s function.   
Soon a second generation of computers emerged using transistors instead of 
vacuum tubes, but was still assembled by hand keeping the price high (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  These computers gained commercial use for automating single processes 
such as clerical work including payroll and billing (Galliers & Leidner, 2003; Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).   
From 1964 to 1979, the third generation of computers brought many changes 
(Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  Miniaturization began with printing thousands of transistors 
onto a single silicon chip (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  Mainframes became common in 
most corporations and additionally began to be linked to remote users (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  This required software for the common user and in turn management 
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systems to monitor and control remote users’ access (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  In 
addition to the remote terminal, computers made the leap from the floor to the desktop in 
the early 1970’s (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Next, individual departments or divisions 
began networking their computers to a central computer (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  With 
more people using computers, the market grew, prices dropped, and smaller companies 
soon were able to acquire the processing capabilities previously only held by large 
corporations (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
1980 marked the start of today’s computer generation characterized by integrated 
circuits and continually falling costs (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  This allowed for every 
employee to have a desktop computer of their own (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  
Interestingly, despite department networks existing (recall the remote terminals linked to 
a central machine) desktops were not initially connected to one another (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  Additionally, since prices were so low, unit funds were used to purchase 
hardware and software (Wilson, 1993).  This meant there was no strategic view of what 
was being purchased throughout an organization.  As such, since this was on an 
individual basis, it led to multiple types of computers and software dispersed throughout 
the organization (Wilson, 1993).  The only way to eventually link these disparate 
networks was to use gateways which were expensive, hard to maintain, slow and 
inefficient (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  Gateways were systems that could take the input 
from one system and translate it so the receiving machine could understand that input.  In 
the 1990’s organizational networks started appearing, however, and architectures for the 
entire enterprise are now used (Evernden & Evernden, 2003). 
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 As computers evolved an entire cast of workers evolved to manage and design the 
systems, including programmers, systems analysts, and IS managers (Laudon & Laudon, 
1997).  Perhaps the most influential person, however, was the non-technical user who 
needed to share information with others.  With non-technical users came the trend of non-
technical people providing requirements to technical people (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
This started the issue of communicating between two groups that spoke different jargon.  
The result was misinterpretation of requirements leading to systems that did not fulfill the 
non-technical users desires (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  This set the stage for the 
antagonistic environment that would develop between “business people” and “IT 
people”.    
In efforts to mitigate the chaotic environment of computers that couldn’t share 
information with each other, formal methods for designing systems were created that 
included requirements generation and software engineering (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
To oversee these processes the discipline of project management came about (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  In parallel, as technology grew and the capability of computers grew, so 
did the size and complexity of projects, but with no room for the users’ inputs (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  The paradigm of division of labor persisted in organizing IS departments 
where programmers, system analysts, and users were physically separated, developing 
their piece of the system in isolation (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  This obviously led to 
difficult integration problems later which, in turn, caused budgets and schedules to be 
exceeded (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  One of the integration issues was that no standards 
were in place for programming leaving programmers to do as they saw fit (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  Then, in the early 1970’s IBM invented the idea of structured project 
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teams with integrated management which brought the pieces together while they were 
designed (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
 As computers and the management systems to design computers as parts of 
integrated systems evolved, the substance they were used to manipulate evolved as well.  
In the late 1960’s the focus changed from processing raw data to the data itself (Galliers 
& Leidner, 2003).  As people began trying to share the data, they started recognizing the 
information redundancy issue.  The idea appeared that a basic set of data used for many 
applications could be maintained in a single location, and thus a data management system 
was born (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  By the end of the 1970’s data was viewed as a 
resource.  This view fostered the database system and representation of data in a 
hierarchy (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Soon the limits of hierarchies were identified and 
relational databases were created. 
 Over the past 60 years the equipment, resource, and people involved in 
information systems have evolved.  They started out as isolated, singular entities, and 
grew into integrated communal systems adding up to be more than the sum of their parts.  
Computers started out as monolithic machines in a room with limited singular functions 
and capability and turned into a vast network of integrated components that is flexible 
and adaptable and capable of several functions.  Information grew from instances of 
unsharable data to warehouses of information accessed by many users for multiple 
purposes.  People who were once isolated in their small compartments have had their 
walls knocked down.  They have been integrated as components of a team to tackle any 
problem presented from a system-wide view. 
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Parallels Between Information Systems and the Ballistic Missile Defense System 
 
 
 After reviewing the evolution of IS and the BMDS many similarities emerge.  
Both systems began as stand-alone entities with single functions.  The components that 
evolved into integrated systems started as complex, intricate machines.  As technology 
improved, capability also grew.  With new capability came new diverse requirements to 
fulfill.  Both systems saw a need for project management as complexity became more and 
more difficult to manage.  Along with growing costs, expectations rose.  This resulted in 
pressure on both systems to perform and to get the most out of those systems for as long 
as possible.  This pressure solidified the need for a disciplined approach to project 
management.  For the BMDS elements, project management took the form of systems 
engineering, a technical form of management.   
 As IS evolved an IM culture developed and IM subcultures (i.e. programmers, IT, 
system designers) developed.  IS started out with computer engineers and technicians.  
Then, programmers, system analysts, information managers, and several other functional 
positions appeared.  Each of these positions, while interconnected, had individual 
specialties with their own language and perspective.  The BMDS elements, meanwhile, 
did not form cultures in the same way.  Since military members move positions from time 
to time, the culture was not element specific, but service specific to that element.  Still, 
many other cultures exist within the military and service culture.  For example, SBIRS 
and STSS have a military culture, Air Force sub-culture, and space sub-sub-culture.   
Additionally, within the program there is a contracted company such as Boeing with its 
own culture, and government civilians with their own culture.  All of these groups have 
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been isolated in the past but have been recently brought together with the advent of the 
integrated product team composed of military, civilian, and contractor members. 
 Another similarity which is a consequence of developing from stovepipes is 
inability to integrate.  As IS grew in isolation (until it became possible to link the 
individual departments), they incorporated disparate equipment and software.  When the 
time came to integrate, the individual IS were found to be incompatible.  Not wanting to 
waste their investment, instead of creating a plan and procuring machines that could talk 
to each other, companies invested in gateway products to make the various machines 
communicate.  The BMDS has seen the same development.  With the investment of tens 
of billions of dollars, the DoD has decided to further invest billions to create workaround 
solutions and patches to make the various elements communicate.  This has been 
embodied in the C2BMC.  The IM world learned it is better to build a system from an 




Information Management Principles 
 
 
 There are several recurring themes or principles in IM in general.  But, there are 
no standard set of concrete principles.  To determine if IM principles apply to the BMDS, 
a literature review was conducted to compile a list of IM principles that could be 
integrated into a model for application.  Upon conducting a literature review of 14 
sources composed of articles, texts, a university, and two military services, a list of 
common principles were compiled.  From this list nine of the most prevalent principles 
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which may be useful to the BMDS, but not being explicitly applied were selected.  The 
nine principles and their frequency of appearance in the literature are shown in Figure 1 
below.  Additional principles were mentioned but were either not appropriate for this 
thesis or too overarching.  For instance, the principle of security was mentioned multiple 
times, however, the BMDS is definitely using this principle with great care as a military 
system.  The nine principles are not necessarily being accounted for in the BMDS and are 
closely, if not exclusively, tied to IM.  Finally, the principles are not isolated, but heavily 
interrelated and interdependent. 
 Information Strategy.   
According to Evernden, the lack of a strategic view is the most costly problem 
that today’s organizations face (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  Strategy is additionally 
important to ensure the systems meet their goals.  IS implemented at the direction of an 
information strategy is a competitive weapon that can be used proactively (Gordon & 
Gordon, 1999).  As computers, which are supposed to help us manage information, have 
become more capable, people have filled them with larger quantities of complex 
information that needs to be managed and exploited (Wilson, 1993).  Instead of using the 
overwhelming information as a weapon to exploit, a gap has formed from this volume 
between the amount of information available and the capability for users to internalize it 
for use (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  The answer to this problem may be an effective 
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Figure 1. IM Principles Compiled from Literature Review 
 
Information Strategy is a specific derived strategy that affects goals, operations, 
products, services, and environmental relationships to aid the organization in gaining an 
edge over competition (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).    It is derived from the corporate 
business strategy (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  The plan supports the overall 
organizational strategic plan describing pertinent systems development, rationale, current 
status, an IS/IT management strategy, implementation plan, and budget.  This also 
addresses impacts on organizational structure, authority, and processes (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  A Strategic IS Plan is derived from the information strategy to determine 
Information Technology (IT) needs which will support the information and business 
strategy (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
An effective information strategy must account for external environmental 
changes as well as existing organizational capabilities (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  It 
should also account for the organization’s culture (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  It can be 
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created analytically such as from derived requirements of the business and information 
strategy, it can be created to specifically address a specific problem such as a poor 
understanding of competitors, or it can represent political influences (i.e. written with a 
bias towards implementing a preconceived technical solution) (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
One formal process conducted to create the information strategy is enterprise analysis, 
which asks managers what information they need, how they use information, where they 
get that information, the environment it is acquired in, the purposes their information 
fulfills, and their method for decision making with the information (Laudon & Laudon, 
1997).  Inputs should come from many departments (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).   
To have a chance of actually being implemented, information strategy must be 
accomplished by senior leaders, not a low-level IT manager (Wilson, 1993).  These high-
level executives will set the long-term policies and objectives the information strategy is 
supporting (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Further, what is key to information strategy is not 
just that it is derived from the organization’s business strategy, but that it is considered 
during the formulation of the organization’s overall strategy.  This coordination will 
strategically align the business and information strategies (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  It 
makes sense to do this since a good information strategy will impact the business strategy 
(Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Information Strategy takes into account all the following 
areas and organizes them like pieces of a puzzle.  Information Strategy is not a stagnant 
plan however; it must be reformulated regularly. 
Information Technology.   
As the history shows in CH 1, IT has been the focus of organizations’ IM efforts.  
Corporations have made large investments in IT, but not IM (Evernden & Evernden, 
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2003).  However, IT has typically failed to produce the results in productivity or in 
profits (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  In fact, the very systems that are supposed to help 
us manage information often cause new issues by increasing the amount and complexity 
of the information requiring management (Wilson, 1993).  Even worse, the information 
may not meet the needs of the user (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  The lesson organizations 
seem to refuse to learn is that IT is not a solution, but an enabler (Evernden & Evernden, 
2003). 
Wal-Mart became a giant, not by using the latest IT innovation, but by wisely 
using organizational knowledge (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  Before purchasing IT the 
organization must understand the information important to the organization and its 
required structure (i.e. develop an IA) appropriate for the organization (Evernden & 
Evernden, 2003).  In looking at the major IT investments of the last five years (data 
warehousing, data mining, business intelligence, customer relationship management, e-
commerce, enterprise applications, KM or corporate intranet/extranets), they all use 
information (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  Understanding the information allows IT to 
be employed optimally.  Simply automating current processes does not yield IT’s full 
potential (Laudon & Laudon, 1997). 
In addition to the information and IT used to manipulate that information, the 
people aspect must be accounted for as mentioned above.  In 1992 Microsoft and the 
Institute of Management conducted a survey that found despite a majority of managers 
acknowledging the importance of IT, almost all feared it (Wilson, 1993).  This shows that 
IT cannot fulfill its potential unless organizations support training their people (Evernden 
& Evernden, 2003).  Additionally, with technology continuously changing, technical 
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skills must also be continuously updated (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Laudon further adds 
that for IT to be accepted the organizational environment, structure, culture and politics 
must be accounted for (Laudon & Laudon, 1997). 
 When IT is used properly, it can have significant impact.  IT can transition an 
organization into a flat structure using decentralized control composed of flexible 
generalists who use instantly available information to produce mass-customized products 
and services (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  In addition to flat structures, IT allows team-
based management through lateral communication (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  IT allows 
automation, rationalization, reengineering, and paradigm shifts (Laudon & Laudon, 
1997).  But all affects must be accounted for.  Instituting enterprise networking, for 
instance, must address: loss of management control (centralized control vs. end-user 
decision making and productivity); organizational changes (reengineering vs. cultural 
backlash); hidden costs (additional highly paid tech support vs. less workers); and 
difficulty of network reliability and security (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  IT is not a 
cookie cutter solution, but an enabler to a well thought out and planned solution to 
strategic change. 
Change.   
While Change may seem to be an overarching principle like leadership, it is 
critical to IM.  The principle of Change describes the nature of information, thus 
information’s life cycle described below and the requirement to update the Information 
Strategy mentioned above.  I will discuss three key components: change management, 
change in the information market, and organizational change.   
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Change Management.   
Change Management provides a plan for implementing new ideas and innovation.  
When changes such as new technology are required, impacts to the organization (i.e. 
structural change, alignment) occur which must be managed.  According to Galliers, this 
role may be the most important in an IS department as change management can 
determine how successful IT is implemented (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Areas impacted 
include: business processes, the information architecture (IA), organizational structure 
(i.e. staffing levels), power structures (i.e. who controls what information), and culture 
(Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  
The person who carries out this function must have credibility and a fundamental 
understanding of the information strategy and how end-users operationally accomplish its 
objectives and goals (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  This person is called a change agent and 
is often a part of the IS department (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  The change agent 
interacts with those affected, especially groups where power is shifted (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).   Since changes from an information strategy can affect the whole 
organization, this person must understand more than just the IS/IT department (Galliers 
& Leidner, 2003).  Change agents must be technically competent, but able to relate to 
end-users to effectively accentuate the positives of the new changes (Galliers & Leidner, 
2003).  They must be able to do this by selecting the right tool; political advocacy, 
facilitation, or technical expertise (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
This is necessary because while some employees may welcome change seeing its 
benefits, others will resist perceiving certain aspects of the change as detrimental to their 
interests (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  Resistance can come in many forms.  Active 
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resistance may take the form of causing errors, disruption, turnover, and possibly 
sabotage (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  Even those who seem open to the changes may 
avoid new systems (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  The change management section of an 
information strategy should include ways to overcome these forms of resistance through 
end-user participation, training, management coercion, and incentives (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  Laudon and Evernden agree that training is an important aspect of 
managing change (Evernden & Evernden, 2003; Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  The plan 
should also address the organizational culture (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
Changing Information Market.   
As stated above, the environment in which an organization operates is constantly 
changing.  Globalization alone has significant impacts to organizations such as increased 
competition which forces companies to reevaluate the quality of their goods and services 
(Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  This competition is brought by borders disappearing as 
information flows without regard to political or geographic limits (Wilson, 1993).  The 
quantity of private information traveling freely doubles every six years (Wilson, 1993).  
Technology in general is changing at such a pace managers must continuously assess 
how well their existing technology satisfies their information needs (Gordon & Gordon, 
1999).  The internet has been a primary player bringing buyers and vendors together in 
the new global economy (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  These environmental changes lead 





Organizational Change.   
Organizational Change is a specific consequence of changing information and the 
changing IT which helps us manage it.  As stated above, the environment has changed to 
a global market which complicates business operations, yet demands more flexible and 
responsive companies.  This increase in complexity requires new IS (Laudon & Laudon, 
1997).  The power of these systems has grown more rapidly making it difficult for 
organizations to apply it optimally since organizational change occurs at a slower pace 
due to cultural inertia (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  The changes required include altering 
their structure and reallocating control of information (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  
Organizational structure is made of the division of labor, coordination of positions, and 
the formal reporting relationships (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Traditional organizations 
use hierarchies which restrain the flow of information since it stops at each level of 
structure (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Using IT, executives can instantly make 
information available throughout the organization increasing their span of control, and 
eliminating the need for much of middle management in traditional structures (Gordon & 
Gordon, 1999).  This flattens the organization and makes it more responsive since 
feedback can also be obtained more quickly.   
Innovative IS drives changes in strategy and processes as well (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  All these changes must be aligned for synergy as described below.  This 
all links back to information.  When an organization changes proactively, in a planned 
manner (as apposed to a reactionary, haphazard manner), they use information about the 
required change.  It is this information that must be used to construct the new IA and 
organizational structures (Evernden & Evernden, 2003). 
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Value.   
Value is the characteristic of information that makes it important to organizations 
as a resource and motivates the other principles to be applied.  The monetary value of 
information is the primary driver leading to its utilization.  It is easy to see how 
information can have monetary value.  Profits can be obtained through the laws of 
intellectual property such as patents and copyrights (Wilson, 1993).  Additionally, 
information can be traded much like a commodity such as corn, autos, or machines 
(Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  While this may seem obvious and straight forward, patents 
that are valuable to one person at one time may not be so to another person at another 
time.  The value depends on interpretation and experience (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  
For example, the patent for the internal combustion engine was once very valuable to 
Ford, but has no value to a banking company today.   
To have monetary value, information must have certain characteristics that make 
it good, useful information.  Organizations only value information that is relevant, timely, 
consistent, and accurate (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  It must also be accessible, reliable, 
and secure (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Further more, it must be complete, clear, and 
useful in decision making (Wilson, 1993).  The profitability of companies depends on 
good decision-making throughout an organization, which depends on the information 
available throughout the organization (Wilson, 1993).  Finally, organizational 
information must be of good quality.  This means it is accurate, precise, credible, current, 
pertinent, relevant, reliable, simple, and valid (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  And for 
customers it is available at the right time, right place, and correct format, lest they will go 
somewhere else (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).   
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The way organizations get information to the organization is through the IS.  The 
IS is also how organizations dispense valuable information.  Business success can depend 
on an IS that perpetuates quality information and makes its management easy (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  As mentioned above, information must be relevant.  To ensure 
information is relevant, an IS must only contain pertinent information.  That is, it is 
equally important to omit or delete unimportant information, which if available can 
distract users (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
Alignment.   
Studies have repeatedly reported that the alignment of IT and organizational 
objectives is a major concern of IS managers (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Additionally, 
senior managers (other than those in IS) agree that alignment of IS with the business 
strategy is critical (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  Studies have also shown that it improves 
organizational performance (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
Gordon defines strategic alignment as the “fit” of organizational goals and 
objectives with its IS.  A similar explanation describes how well the IT department’s 
mission objectives and plans and business mission objectives and plan support each other 
(Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Further, alignment can have an intellectual and social 
dimension (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  It’s the social dimension that is influenced by 
culture and thus much harder to address (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  To gain social 
alignment, the business and IT cultures within an organization must have shared domain 
knowledge, an understanding of what the other culture does and the significance of their 
contribution to the organization (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Social alignment contributes 
to intellectual alignment, the degree to which IT and business plans are interrelated 
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(Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Four factors influence this state: shared domain knowledge, 
IT implementation success, communication between IT and business departments, 
amount of coordination between the business and IT planning process when alignment is 
determined (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
There are six types of alignment: Strategic (between business and IS strategies), 
Structural (between business and IS structures), Business (between business strategy and 
structure), IS (between IS strategy and structure), and cross dimension (business structure 
and IS strategy; business strategy and IS structure) (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  These can 
be reached by looking at the organizational strategies, structures, and planning methods 
or the players and their values, interpersonal communication, and level of shared domain 
knowledge (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  They are not static, but dynamic due to a 
changing environment which may require new strategies affecting the organizational 
structure (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Because these aspects rarely change at the same 
pace, only short term alignment is realistically achievable (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
This means, like strategy (and in parallel with it), alignment must be reevaluated 
periodically.  Important to note is that alignment changes that are revolutionary (large 
departure from the current state) are hindered by cultural and structural impediments 
requiring well planned change management.  These revolutionary changes are forced by 
environmental shifts, sustained low performance, influential outsiders, new leadership, 
and perception transformation (Galliers & Leidner, 2003). 
Standards.   
Most people understand what a standard is.  However, their importance is taken 
for granted.  Standards can increase efficiency and flexibility by allowing systems to 
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share information and processes, creating a single system everyone and anyone can use 
(Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  This means, people can be used in more roles since they all 
can operate the system.  Without standards information and processes often cannot be 
shared.  Confusion and misunderstanding takes place because words have similar, but 
different meanings (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  For example, what is the difference 
between an estimate and a quote?  This distinction may vary depending on whether you 
ask an insurance salesperson or a mechanic.  This means that context, which places the 
information in the proper situation providing the correct meaning, is extremely important 
(Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  The responsibility of establishing standards in an 
organization resides with the information professionals who are obligated to create and 
establish them through strategic planning as business information needs evolve (Gordon 
& Gordon, 1999).  When creating standards for a single purpose, such as missile defense, 
the most appropriate format must be used to ensure information is interpreted as intended, 
data is not confused, and misinformation is not created (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  
As such this principle must be instituted for any action to be carried out.  This function is 
carried out for many technical disciplines by the International Organization of Standards 
(ISO).   
In the context of IS, language is the primary element of design and operation 
(Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  For global systems, standards must be applied to 
hardware, software, and communication formats (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  One way 
this is being done is by creating open systems.  Open systems enable different equipment 
and services to work together because they are built on public, nonproprietary standards 
and protocols everyone can access and understand (Laudon & Laudon, 1997). 
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Finally, not only should standards be applied to communicating, but also in 
measuring and validating information and the systems it resides on.  To improve, change 
must occur.  To determine if the right change occurred, some measurement must be made 
to validate the change (Wilson, 1993).   
Standardization is a trade-off.  While it can lead to flexibility, it does so by 
placing limits (i.e. you can only use one system for everyone to understand it) (Gordon & 
Gordon, 1999).  Additionally, there are cultural impacts (Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  A 
company choosing an Apple OS may have to wage a big fight against the Windows 
culture for it to be implemented.  In general, standards are necessary and beneficial.  The 
trick is to strategically determine how much and which ones to use for each organization. 
Information Architecture.   
All organizations have an IA whether formally planned or by default (i.e. the 
natural, yet chaotic, result of buying several computers and automating a file system) 
(Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  It is the form IT takes to achieve the goals of the 
information strategy (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  If well planned, it can be the most 
powerful tool for an organization (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  A default IA may be a 
decentralized architecture characterized by isolated islands of information where data is 
not shared, utility is limited, repeated entry is required, and inconsistencies may occur 
(Gordon & Gordon, 1999).  The hidden costs of informally creating an IA are much more 
than that of a strategically constructed IA making the planning time worth while 
(Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  Using information without understanding the IA is 
analogous to using money without understanding the accounting structure (Evernden & 
Evernden, 2003). 
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IA is necessary for large, complex organizations where change is constant.  
Additionally, when there is potential for economies of scale and a high degree of 
coordination is required, IA is beneficial (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  Organizations 
that need IA deal with great amounts of complex information, exist in an unpredictable 
environment, provide information based products or services, share information through a 
supply chain, and have consistently changing information needs (Evernden & Evernden, 
2003).  
One thing to remember is that there is no single IA that works for every 
organization, and realistically, each organization will have a slightly unique IA (Laudon 
& Laudon, 1997).  What’s more, due to change, organizations will need to update their 
IA periodically in parallel with the Information Strategy (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  
Organizations can change their IA four ways: Optimization, which improves the IA; 
Augmentation, which extends the IA adding value or using it in a different way; 
Transformation, which replaces the IA with a new architecture; and Creation, which 
presents totally new structures (i.e. new staff positions) that didn’t exist before (Evernden 
& Evernden, 2003). 
 So what is an Information Architecture?  According to Evernden: 
  IA is a foundation discipline describing the theory, principles, guidelines,  
standards, conventions, and factors for managing information as a  
resource.  It produces drawings, charts, plans, documents, designs,  
blueprints and templates, helping everyone make efficient, effective,  
productive, and innovative use of all types of information (Evernden & Evernden, 
2003).  
 
IA has the following characteristics: it views information as a resource; it affects 
everyone, not just the IA designer; it accounts for all kinds of information (not just IT); it 
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serves as a foundation for organizational structure, information flow, and processes; it’s a 
discipline that requires expertise (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  The most important 
aspect of IA is that it requires an organization to know WHAT information is important 
(i.e. has value), and that determines the scope and the required IT (Gordon & Gordon, 
1999).  The tendency is for organizations to not understand ALL the information they 
need to manage, thereby creating insufficient architectures (Evernden & Evernden, 
2003).  Additionally, IAs fail because of a lack of commitment, poorly defined 
requirements (i.e. not knowing what information is used), overly complex planning tools 
for using information, ambiguous projects (i.e. purchasing IT without a plan), not 
knowing how useful available information is, and not implementing a process for keeping 
information up to date (i.e. not understanding the information life cycle) (Evernden & 
Evernden, 2003).  IA enables everyone to have the right information available and know 
how to use it (Evernden & Evernden, 2003). 
Culture.   
Culture is perhaps the most pervasive and underestimated area in information 
management.  Culture is defined by a set of assumptions shared by a group which 
governs its actions.  Within the organization, culture consists of the core beliefs of how 
things should operate (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  This organizational culture serves as a 
unifying force that generates a common, mutual understanding on procedures, processes, 
and policy (written and unwritten), and is also a strong barrier to change (Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  The organization’s culture is greatly influenced by the market 
environment and senior managers (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).   
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 The nature of culture, intangible beliefs and behaviors, has concrete consequences 
in organizations.  Culture manifests itself in symbols, organizational structures, power 
structures, control systems, and informal (but set) ways of doing things (Galliers & 
Leidner, 2003).  Corporate processes no longer necessary persist for no explainable 
reason (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  For example, entering data by hand instead of 
scanning it in.  This example also serves to demonstrate culture’s resistance to 
technology.  IS are sociotechnical systems that include people as well as technology 
(Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  This implies that new technology has social impacts, which 
means the people who use it must be taken into account and thus their culture must be 
taken into account (i.e. change management) (Galliers & Leidner, 2003; Laudon & 
Laudon, 1997).  A cultural gap has been identified between IT and business people which 
has been a major cause of system development failures (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  If 
this is not done, the culture in the form of unconscious bias will be embedded in the IS 
through IS implementations that support the culture (Laudon & Laudon, 1997).  To 
combat this, an organization must understand artifacts, which are the remaining beliefs 
based on forgotten complex factors (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  This is classically 
exemplified by a new employee asking why a process is done a certain way, and the 
supervisor replying it’s just the way it’s always been done. 
 Culture has been discussed on a group level, but it must also be understood that 
cultures exist on the subunit and even individual level (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Two 
important subcultures are individualistic and collectivistic.  An individualistic culture has 
a loose network with soft ties where people worry about themselves first and the group 
second (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  A collectivistic culture puts the group first to achieve 
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a desired sense of belonging (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Individualistic cultures are 
results oriented and private as opposed to collectives which are process oriented and open 
(Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  This affects information flow and power structures.  The 
individualistic culture will hoard information to keep power, while a collective will allow 
the free flow of information to promote organizational gains (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  
Recognizing culture types will aid in identifying barriers to changes such as 
organizational restructuring (Galliers & Leidner, 2003).  Individualistic cultures will 
provide steeper resistance to flattening of organizations which requires/promotes 
information sharing.  While culture can have many negatives such as being inflexible and 
one-track minded, they also provide stability and clear direction (Galliers & Leidner, 
2003). 
Information Life Cycle.   
The discussion of value depicted information as a temporal entity with its 
importance dependent on timing.  The Information Life Cycle is a framework for 
formally and proactively recognizing this aspect of information.  Information in 
organizations is generated internally with a single purpose (Evernden & Evernden, 2003).  
Once this purpose is fulfilled, it is expired and no longer useful.  Problems arise when 
information is retained beyond its useful life resulting in inaccurate records which are not 
only useless, but could be detrimental.  Information’s life cycle is accounted for in an IA 







These nine IM principles were structured to create the framework depicted below 
in Figure 2 for how to institute and carry out IM.  The model shows that Information 
Strategy is the overarching strategic plan for instituting the other principles.  The Change 
Management Plan explains how to deal with change (i.e. structure, processes, 
marketplace) and cultural issues.  The IA defines what information is valuable; correct 
organizational, process, and strategic alignment; IT which enables the information 
strategy goals and objectives; applicable standards for the system; and the life cycle for 






























 Thus far, this paper has depicted a model of the BMDS (group of disparate 
elements, legacy and new, integrated by the C2BMC element) and of Information 
Management Principles.  To determine if the latter applies to the former outside expert 
opinions will be obtained. 
 This thesis seeks to determine if IM principles apply to the BMDS.  Because this 
idea has never been entertained, it is desired to seek a valid and strong indication of its 
applicability.  Therefore, a small group of experts with the experience and applicable 
knowledge will be sought to provide credible salient opinion on the thesis. 
 Through the Delphi Technique a group of relevant experts are used in a structured 
communication.  Generally, the group is posed questions about a problem and then 
provides feedback.  The feedback is collected and points of disagreement are noted.  The 
group is presented the points of disagreement in an attempt to rectify these points.  This 
process continues until general consensus is reached about the original problem (Linstone 
& Turoff, 1975). 
 The Delphi technique has some limitations.  The group is composed of a small 
number of people.  However, these people are experts.  But, the experts must be carefully 
chosen to ensure their background is relevant to the subject area.  Language must be 
carefully selected when communicating with the group to ensure objectivity and clarity, 
especially when presenting data of one member to the other members.  The moderator 
must not ignore disagreements such that dissenters become frustrated and stop 
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participating in the group.  The Delphi Technique can be time consuming if it is not the 
primary job of its participants (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). 
 The Delphi Technique is used to create a common credible opinion about a 
subject (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  Despite its possible challenges, the technique can 
provide a reasonable estimate of future fact.   The technique has been used by the 
military, health industry, and many more around the world to make plausible projections 
about future implementations of strategic ideas (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  This thesis 
aims at projecting whether a new idea of how to manage a complex system would work.  
To do this, the Delphi Technique is a reasonable method.   
 A Delphi Group will be used to provide expert opinion on whether the model of 
IM composed of the nine principles applies to the BMDS and its integration.  The group 
is composed of three experts.  Expertise is defined by experience in their profession and 
with at least one element of the BMDS.  The group has a mix of military, civilian 
contractor, and government contractor experience.  Additionally a wide variety of 
technical and management experience exists.  
 The group will be presented with an executive summary of Chapters 1 and 2 
which includes the Information Management model and BMDS description.  Given this 
information, the group will be asked four open-ended questions about whether the 
principles are applied, the model’s applicability, and the model’s possible application to 
integrating the BMDS elements.  With each question an example for clarification, and to 
spark dialogue, will be given.  Upon receipt and synthesis of the initial responses, follow 
up questions will be posed presenting ideas from one member to the other members for 
comment and clarification.  Based on a second round of responses a final round of 
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questions for clarification may be performed.  The results of the Delphi Group structured 





























 A Delphi Group provided expert opinion on the applicability of IM principles to 
the BMDS.  The members had experience in multiple elements of the BMDS.  They had 
military and civilian experience.  Members worked with and for companies contracted to 
design and build multiple elements of the BMDS.  Work experience exceeded 20 years 
for all members.  Engineering expertise was in the areas of missile defense technology.  
Additionally management background included training in Total Quality Management, 
Six-Sigma, and Lean.  The members were presented a summary of the literature, and the 
information management principles shown below in Figure 3.  With that information, 
they were asked to provide their expert opinion on the principles’ applicability to the 
BMDS and its integration.  Below are the results of that discussion with a brief summary 
in Figure 3. 
Round 2
Model Relavent Being Applied Being Applied
Information 
Strategy X Maybe No
Change X No No
- Culture X Somewhat Yes
Information 
Architecture X Maybe No
- Value X No Comment No Comment
- Alignment X Somewhat No Comment
- Standards X Somewhat No Comment
- Information 
Life Cycle X Maybe No Comment
- Information 
Technology X Poorly No





Figure 3.  Summary of Results from Delphi Group 
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Initial Delphi Responses 
 
 
Application.   
The Delphi group agreed that IM principles are already being applied.  There 
were different opinions on which principles were applied and how effectively.  All of the 
principles were identified as being applied except Information Strategy, which was 
specifically commented on as being weak or nonexistent.  Additionally, at least one 
member felt IA was especially poorly applied throughout the system.  Culture was said to 
be set at the Agency level which affected how information was valued and treated at the 
element level.  Additionally, element culture was said to be developed early in program 
creation after a contractor is chosen. 
 Application of Non-applied Principles.   
The group had different opinions on what principles were being applied.  
Information Strategy was restated as being absent, while the intent of the Information 
Strategy was stated to be carried out by other documents such as an Acquisition Strategy 
which addresses IT, structure, culture, and processes.  Additionally, Culture was 
identified as being poorly understood by the acquisition community which may affect 
program execution. 
An additional distinction was made between the element level and MDA level.  
Different principles are applied at varying degrees.  For example, Information Strategy 
and IA are perceived to be more important at the MDA level and less so at the element 
level.  They feel these should be flowed down from agency to element. 
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Another specific deficiency mentioned, but not agreed on, was Information Life 
Cycle.  One member felt this was inherently taken care of by the system while another 
identified the importance of archiving lessons learned for producing future increments of 
the system.  While this is being done in at least one element, it is not happening at the 
agency level which is in a better position to make effective use of this concept.  The 
emphasis is on creation and use of information while disposal is overlooked or ignored. 
 Non-applicability.   
The group unanimously agreed that all the principles were relevant and should be 
applied to the BMDS and the individual elements.  Again, a distinction was made as to 
which principles were more important to the element and agency levels. 
 Application to BMDS Integration.   
The group had varying ideas in this area.  Two principles of the model came 
through as being clearly beneficial, however.  Information Strategy is clearly perceived as 
being desired and necessary.  One member explained that an information strategy could 
direct information flows creating an overall more unified flow.  The idea of time phasing 
the information strategy with planned system changes was also offered.  Further, the 
effect of not having an information strategy is to constrain elements to individual 
optimization.  It also places each element in a reactionary mode with respect to the other 
elements.  For example, without an information strategy that details how each element 
uses information from the other elements, individual elements are forced to assess 
possibilities as they become available.  This means missed opportunities because they are 
not provided the ability to use all the available capability.  They can only use what their 
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system (designed as is) will allow.  Additionally, integration is hampered by elements 
that do not understand BMDS level objectives, needs, and requirements. 
Information Architecture is also perceived as being beneficial (especially at the 
beginning of a program), but there was a sense of it not being quite as critical.  This is 
because there is an implicit assumption that an architecture exists at a top level that is 
being worked toward.  Additionally, the contractor is heavily leaned on to institute IA as 
well as the other principles of the model.  Even so, they felt IA would aid in 
understanding issues vertically and horizontally.  It would also aid in communications 
and defining the information flows.   
Standards were pointed out as being a principle that could offer help.  Here, the 
standards must be unambiguous such that all cultures (military, contractor, etc.) can 
understand them, and more importantly, that they remain consistent through time.  
 Additional Results.   
Open-ended questions provided additional comments outside the area of the 
specific questions.  The group identified possible changes to the model, barriers to its 
application, and some ramifications of the model. 
Security was mentioned as an additional principle that should be added to the 
model.  Security was pointed out as influencing, if not dictating, how the other principles 
were applied.    For instance, technology may bring on changes that breach current 
security protocols.  This was demonstrated in the military when cell phones began 
integrating cameras.  Additionally, security scrutinizes all information generated.  This 
scrutiny necessitates good IM practices.     
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 As mentioned above, the BMDS has various hierarchical levels.  The Delphi 
group identified that the IM Model can be applied differently at these different levels.  
The three levels are System level, Intra-element level, and Inter-element level.  These 
three perspectives place different priorities on different aspects of the model.   
 Several barriers to implementing the IM Model were mentioned.  First, while 
needed change was said to be quickly recognized, its implementation was slow due to 
current processes which require communication to many entities and a lack of adequate 
communications IT for flowing this information.  Second, while standards are most 
effective when stable, technology used in the BMDS continues to evolve.  Third, the 
culture of stovepiping still exists.  MDA is perceived to be developing stovepipes in the 
elements fostering protectionist tendencies that contradict the need to integrate the 
elements.  Despite a MDA directive to use multi-use technologies, finding the uses 
outside one’s own element for technologies is low on the priority list with little effort 
expended toward it.  Forth, the security environment is an especially difficult barrier to 
penetrate due to varying security classifications.  Fifth, the entire Delphi group did not 
feel instituting the IM Model on their own was their responsibility.  They felt it was their 
duty to carry out any directives, but those directives should be constructed by IM 
professionals at the BMDS level.  Sixth, communication between contractor and 
government is impeded by hidden agendas. 
 Despite these barriers, there are motivating benefits to instituting the model.  In 
addition to aiding integration efforts, Information Strategy could help cut costs and make 
organizations leaner and more efficient.  Information Strategy would also specify 
necessary inter-element interactions. 
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 Finally, starting early was stated to be essential.  Instituting the IM Model early 
can be used to create and mold an IM culture.  This can lead to improved 
communications and inter-element coordination.  This could lead to identifying problem 
areas ahead of time.  It can also serve to share information and get buy-in early for 
forecasted changes.  
 
 
Second Round Delphi Responses 
 
 
 The initial responses received did not say that an Information Strategy document 
did not exist.  Follow-up responses clarified that no one in the Delphi group has seen this 
document.  However, they reiterated that functions of an explicit information strategy 
were carried out in the Acquisition Strategy and other plans derived from that strategy.  
Further, these functions were flowed all the way down to the end-user level.  
Additionally, these documents are updated twice a year, which further meets the intent of 
the information strategy.  While these documents fulfill the functions of Information 
Strategy by instituting the IM principles, they do not do this explicitly.  That is, the 
principles are not specifically called out.  They are also applied by default through 
normal acquisition practices. 
 The Delphi grouped readdressed Culture which the group felt impacted the 
system.  They confirmed that Culture is important and it influences the system in 
different ways such as contractor selection, manning, and system design. 
Culture is factored in during contractor selection through evaluating the processes 
(including IM) the various contractors use.  Those contractors with processes that align 
 56
well with the program office receive favorable scores in those areas.  Past experience (i.e. 
with space or with the actual system) which is a part of the current contractor culture is 
also taken into account.   
The operational system is also impacted by ensuring that different cultures can 
interact with the system.  For instance, the system is designed for use by non-technical 
users, who would not understand all the cultural specifics (e.g. language, symbols, 
processes) of the technical engineering world.   
Finally, programs are manned, to some extent, based on cultural bias.  AF 
programs don’t even consider bringing in other services to man their element program 
offices.  They specifically stick with their own service.  Additionally, contractors favor 
hiring engineers that have worked on other similar programs.  This inspires these cultures 
to exhibit a closed community mentality resulting in a lack of information sharing.  So, 
when one program makes a technological breakthrough that could apply to another 
element, that success and vital information is not communicated. 
 In the area of integration, Information Strategy was again emphasized as a major 
asset.  The point was made that this needs to be created at the beginning of the program 
before a contractor is selected.  This aligns the contractor making the element system 
with the service expected to operate it.  Additionally, one member thought Information 
Strategy should be part of the Acquisition Strategy, as apposed to its own document.  
Further, not having an IA is hindering development progress. 
While it is agreed that this model should have been consciously applied at the 
beginning of all the programs, some thought it cannot be formally instituted in programs 
already underway.  Only future programs can have the model explicitly applied.  One 
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reason for this is that the organizations are too resistant to change.  Another reason is that 
elements that are in development with operational versions to be built later won’t be 
integrated into the operational system.   
 Upon redirect, additional information was obtained.  MDA has the means to 
communicate information directly to all elements via secure websites.  It does not use this 
tool, however, to advance integration through information sharing pertinent to multiple 
elements.  For instance, common standards are not listed for reference by all elements. 
Another interesting perception is that element culture is not established until operations 






 The Delphi group believed that the IM principles are relevant, and some are being 
applied to their element and the BMDS.  Various aspects of the model are being applied 
in varying degrees at different organizational levels.  The IM Model would be beneficial 
to future systems, but cannot be realistically instituted in programs already underway 
because they are too resistant and slow to react to change.  Additionally, attempting to 
enact the model (i.e. create an information strategy, IA, etc.) while simultaneously 
accomplishing the current scheduled work would cause any schedule to slip.   Several 
barriers (e.g. change process, standards stability vs. new technology, stovepipe culture, 
security) to enacting the model were mentioned.  The Delphi Group has not viewed a 
specific Information Strategy Document or Information Architecture, but while they 
agree these would be beneficial to integration, they also agree that their intent is being 
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carried out implicitly in other ways such as in the Acquisition Strategy Plan.  Finally, 
Culture is not only important; it impacts the system in various ways.  It, like the other 
principles, however, is not explicitly addressed.  A new model based on the Delphi Group 







































Affects Application of all Principles
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 The question of this thesis was if IM principles applied to the BMDS?  Further, 
could they be applied to aid in the task of integrating the various elements?  Similar to the 
evolution of IS, the BMDS has evolved from individual elements with singular functions 
to integrated networked systems with multiple functions.  A former director of the MDA 
has stated that integrating these elements is a management problem, not a technical one.  
Much of the BMDS is a type of IS.  Based on their responses, the Delphi group supported 
application of the IM Model constructed of IM principles to the BMDS.   
 
 
Discussion of Delphi Results 
 
 
 The Delphi Group was presented the IM Model and asked four questions.  They 
confirmed that the IM Model is applicable.  Additionally, they revealed that aspects of 
the model are being applied.  For instance, Culture is factored into source selections for 
BMDS element contracts.  Additionally, some standards are specified in accordance with 
military standards and communications standards (e.g. operational frequencies).  Also, 
processes are in place to identify needed changes.   
The Delphi Group showed that while some principles of the model are being 
applied, none are being applied explicitly.  That is, their functions are carried out through 
other means such as an Acquisition Strategy, but an actual Information Strategy and 
Information Architecture do not exist.  This is important because implicit application of 
aspects of the model may not produce the full potential benefits of applying the model 
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explicitly.  Without explicit application, the impact of one principle will not be identified 
with respect to the other principles.  So, while the Acquisition Strategy may be updated 
periodically, alignment may not be adjusted or what makes information valuable 
redefined.  Additionally, the model is created based on the principles being interrelated 
and interdependent.  For example, if random standards are applied, they are not 
necessarily applied to the pertinent information or in the right way.  Also, without an IA, 
there is no way to know if standards are applied across the system.  Without an IA 
elements may apply different standards that aren’t compatible. 
 One major aspect of the model the Delphi Group identified as not being applied is 
Information Strategy.  This principle structures all the other pieces of the model.  
Therefore it was not surprising to find that the Delphi Group mentioned other principles 
in the model were poorly applied, such as IA and IT.  The fact that elements are being 
constrained to optimizing themselves without input from other elements demonstrated the 
importance and relevance of Information Strategy and the model itself. 
 It was surprising to learn that while the Delphi Group felt the model would be 
beneficial to managing and integrating the BMDS, they thought this should only be done 
for new programs.  If only new programs had the model applied, limited results would be 
expected since it is intended to span the entire system and define relationships between 
elements.  What’s more, a suggestion was to apply the model from three perspectives: 
system, intra-element, and inter-element.  It would be difficult to apply the model to the 
system and inter-element if only new systems used the model.  The three-level 
application idea had not been specifically included in the initial model. 
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 Security was another addition to the model.  Chapter 2 explained that Security 
was excluded since it was assumed to be relevant and being stringently applied.  
However, the Delphi Group made multiple points as to why it should be included.  They 
stated that it directs how the other principles are allowed to be implemented and has an 
information focus.  Therefore, Security was added to the model. 
 Security was also brought up as a barrier.  There were several barriers commented 
on.  The other barriers all could be linked to Culture in the sense that these barriers are a 
result of a set way of doing things.  The change process was noted as inadequate and 
there is no legal reason it could not be modified, but cultural behavior dictates that since 
it has been established, it must be the right way.  The MDA technically focused culture 
has established a modus operandi of enacting whatever new technology provides a 
specific capability.  This conflicts with maintaining stable standards, but the cultural 
behavior is to favor technology rather than weigh the impact to the entire system.  The 
tendency of forming stovepiped programs that leads to protectionist behavior is a cultural 
mindset.  The lack of an obligatory sense to enact these principles on their own is a 
cultural manifestation of the military culture where directives are flowed down and self 
initiative is only rewarded if the benefits are immediately recognizable.  Finally, the 
history of defense acquisitions has established the current cultural climate where 
contractors and government operate with hidden agendas that don’t compliment one 
another.  It is not surprising these barriers were mentioned and are linked to culture since 








 The research question was answered and thesis supported by the Delphi Group 
that IM principles can be applied to the BMDS.  The Delphi Group sited how culture 
plays a role in contractor selection, design, and manning.  They also stated that without 
Information Strategy and IA they are constrained to optimization rather than creating 
what is truly needed by the system.  Standards were identified as important as long as 
they were understood and consistent.  Additionally, these principles, within the 
framework of a model, can aid the issue of integration.  Information Strategy was called 
out as needed for determining information flow.  The Delphi Group said an IA could help 
communication horizontally and vertically.  The model should be considered for 
application across the entire BMDS: weapon systems, organization, acquisition, and 
processes.  This includes application within the elements and between the elements as 
well, as the Delphi Group suggested.  In addition to supporting the thesis, the process of 
writing this paper also strongly supported that DoD organizations involved with the 
BMDS are technically focused viewing technology as a solution, not an enabler.  While 
the model should be considered for implementation, doing so would likely encounter 
serious cultural barriers such as those mentioned above which must be well understood. 
 
 
Limitations of Research  
 
 
 The Delphi Group was a panel of experts, but small in number.  They also only 
had experience in some of the BMDS elements.  While the Delphi Group had civilian 
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contractor experience, none were presently employees of civilian contractors.  Finally, 
while relevant experts supported the model, it was not actually applied producing results 
that demonstrate its effects. 
 
 
Recommendations for Future Study 
 
 
Future studies should assemble a larger group with experience in various 
disciplines. Future study would benefit from a group representing each element, MDA, 
and USSTRATCOM.  Future studies may benefit from the perspectives of employees of 
companies such as Boeing, LM, NG, and Raytheon who are all major contractors for 
multiple BMDS systems.  Finally, future studies may benefit from undertaking an 
exercise where the model is applied and results are produced to measure its effectiveness.  
For example, it may be beneficial to apply the model to the GMD element which is 
composed of BMDS representative components.  While it is expected that results would 
show limited effectiveness from being applied to a single element, this would confirm the 
need to apply the model across the entire system.  Additionally, the necessary 
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